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Abstract
The aim of this study is to test whether projection bias exists in consumers’ purchasing deci-
sions for food products. To achieve our aim, we used a non-hypothetical experiment (i.e.,
experimental auction), where hungry and non-hungry participants were incentivized to
reveal their willingness to pay (WTP). The results confirm the existence of projection bias
when consumers made their decisions on food products. In particular, projection bias
existed because currently hungry participants were willing to pay a higher price premium for
cheeses than satiated ones, both in hungry and satiated future states. Moreover, partici-
pants overvalued the food product more when they were delivered in the future hungry con-
dition than in the satiated one. Our study provides clear, quantitative and meaningful
evidence of projection bias because our findings are based on economic valuation of food
preferences. Indeed, the strength of this study is that findings are expressed in terms of will-
ingness to pay which is an interpretable amount of money.
Introduction
Empirical evidence on food choice has shown that consumers are subject to projection bias
when making intertemporal decisions. In their seminal paper, [1] coined the term ‘projection
bias’ to refer to a general bias which arises whenever preferences change over time, causing
individuals to project their current state into the future incorrectly. In particular, when people
predict future preferences, they understand the direction in which their preferences will
change, but they tend to underestimate the degree to which their future preferences will resem-
ble their current preferences [1]. Moreover, the presence of a visceral factor influence, such as
hunger, is considered one of the factors that can cause projection bias [1–3].The term ‘visceral
factor’ refers to a wide range of negative emotions (anger, fear, etc.) which drive states that can
motivate people to engage in impulsive behaviour called ‘out of control’, characterized by
unplanned and unconscious cognitive mediation [2–4]. In particular, projection bias is well
illustrated when hungry people overspend in the supermarket because they tend to think that
their current hunger will endure into the future. However, after having eaten a meal, they real-
ize that if their hunger had been satisfied when they were shopping in the supermarket, they
would not have overspent on these items.
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The objective of this study is to provide quantified evidence of projection bias by incentiviz-
ing people to reveal their truthful preferences for different cheese products. We assessed truth-
ful preferences using an experimental auction, asking individuals the maximum price they
would pay (in other words, their willingness to pay, WTP) for various cheese products.
To our knowledge, there are at least three studies that have examined the projection bias in
food choices. The first is by [5] who approached either hungry or satiated office workers, and
asked them to choose between a healthy snack and a less nutritious snack (e.g. fruit vs candy
bars) to be delivered one week later, either at a specific time of the day when they expected to
be hungry (i.e. late in the afternoon) or when they expected to be satiated (i.e. immediately
after lunch). Results of this experiment confirmed that advance choices were influenced by cur-
rent hunger, because workers with anticipatedfuture hunger chose unhealthier snacks than
satiated workers. On the other hand, hungry subjects chose unhealthy snacks more often for
future consumption in comparison to the currently satiated subjects, leading to evidence of
projection bias.
Along the same lines, [6] conducted a field experiment at a local grocery store and partici-
pants were asked to list the items they intended to purchase. The authors found that if a hungry
shopper received a small piece of food right before entering the food market, they were able to
limit their shopping to the initial items on their shopping list.
Finally, the study carried out by [7] approached the issue of projection bias using a home-
grown experimental auction when bidding on a ham and cheese sandwich. The authors
reported the existence of projection bias when subjects had to predict their future tastes versus
when they bid for a product intended for immediate consumption.
Although the studies of [5][6] and [7] bear important information to the literature,they
present some limitations.
Firstly, in the studies of [5] and [7], the appetite of subjects was manipulated by varying the
time of day when their choices were made. Therefore, hungry and satiated states of individuals
were supposed to depend on the time of day (i.e. before and after lunchtime, respectively).
Consequently, those people who were invited to participate at different times of day (i.e. before
and after lunchtime), might be more likely to come before lunch and others after, and then
they might be influenced by a time-of-day effect.
Secondly, [5] and[6] did not provide clear, quantitative and meaningful evidence of projec-
tion bias because their findings were not based on the economic valuation of food preferences.
To illustrate, the study by [5] was conducted in a hypothetical setting where participants were
required to choose between a healthy and an unhealthy product. However, individuals were
not asked to reveal their willingness to pay for this product. Moreover, [6] reported only differ-
ences in ‘unplanned purchases’, and ‘listless’ shoppers spent a larger proportion of their total
amount on unplanned food items when they were hungry rather than when they were satiated.
However, ‘lustful’ shoppers spent the same proportion of their total amount on unplanned
food items both when they were hungry and when they were satiated. Hence, a limitation of
the study is that the experiment design considered only the proportion of unplanned food
items, thus resulting in it being complicated to connect unplanned purchases to truthful
preferences.
Hence, the current study presents several strengths. Firstly, a manipulation task was applied
to discriminate between initial hungry and satiated levels by feeding participants some unre-
lated food during the auction. Secondly, our results are expressed in terms of willingness to
pay, an interpretable amount of money. Quantifying the projection bias phenomenon is quite
important because of its implications for food companies and retailers when launching a new
product on the food market.
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Thirdly, future delivery moments were distinguished in two perceived levels of hunger or
satiety of the subjects, and to attempt to have similar behaviours in a meal situation, the experi-
ment was set up at the same time of day (before lunch at 1:00 p.m.).
Finally, in order to isolate the effect of changes in attributes and organoleptic characteristics,
the study took into account a non-perishable product such as semi-cured cheese.
The findings of this study confirm that projection bias is prevalent in food decisions, since
hungry subjects overvalue products delivered both in the hungry and satiated future states
compared to satiated subjects. Moreover, overvaluing by currently hungry people is more pro-
nounced when products are given in a future hungry state.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section discusses the hypotheses, the
experimental design, the rationale for the inclusion of the different treatments, and the steps in
the implementation of the auction. The results are presented in the following section, and the
final section discusses the importance and the implications of the findings.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
Respondents were informed by written consent to participate in the study. Each participant
was assigned an ID number and asked to sign a participation and ethical approval form. Proto-
cols and procedures were approved by the Ethics Committee of the Agri-food Research and
Technology Centre (CITA).
Experimental design
We used a homegrown auction that allows for assessing consumers’ valuations for different
products. This valuation method has been extensively used to value different food products in
the last few years. [8] indicated that up 2006, more than 100 academic studies had utilized
experimental auctions to elicit consumers’ preferences for various products. Experimental auc-
tions are popularly used due to their incentive compatibility properties; they provide an incen-
tive to subjects to state their true preferences.
For this experiment the random nth price auction with repeated rounds (i.e. 6 rounds) and the
full bidding approach were employed for several reasons. Firstly, repeated rounds have the benefit
of the learning effect as stated by several authors [8,9,10] who argue that this procedure yields val-
uations more consistent with neoclassical economic theory. On the other hand, since we were
aware of the possibility of the occurrence of bid affiliation effects and other psychological effects
(such as competition or anchoring effects) no price feedback among multiple rounds was reported
[11].Secondly, similar to the Becker-Degroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism [12], the random nth
price works well for off-margin bidders whose values are far from the market price. However, in
contrast to the BDMmechanism andas [13] reported, the random nth price auction has an addi-
tional benefit of encouraging competition amongst bidders similar to the second-price auction.
[14] compared the second Price auction top the BDMwhile [13] compared the second Price auc-
tion to the random nth. [15] compared all three mechanisms and they found that on average the
second price and random nth price auctions were significally more accurate than the BDM.
We decided to use the full bidding process because it has the advantage of eliminating any
aversion to loss and risk exchanging of the participants [16,17] and it is better than the endow-
upgrade method when the products in the auction have the same field substitutes [18].Since in
our experiment, the characteristics of our cheese products have the same field substitutes, we
used the full bidding method which allowed us to eliminate the type of cheese as the third fac-
tor in our experimental design. In the full bidding, each participant had to submit simulta-
neously a bid for each of the auctioned products. These bids were our economic measure of
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interest as it is the maximum total willingness to pay (WTP) for the different cheese products.
Finally, we did not use the reference price of field substitutes of cheese during the auction because
the reference price of field substitutes would increase the bid values as stated by [17,19].
To avoid transaction cost effects, subjects received a signed document in which the experi-
menters stated that they would handdeliver the product to them the next day. To gain the trust
of participants, monitors showed their personal signed business cards with a signed document.
Finally, to homogenize participants’ level of hunger in both treatments, we set the sessions
before lunchtime (at 1:00 p.m.) and manipulated the hunger state during the experiment. This
procedure minimized selection bias that could occur because some people might more likely
participate at lunchtime, while others might more likely come after lunch.
We designed an experimental auction applying a 2x2 full factorial design. The first factor is
the immediate ‘appetite level’ during the experiment (hungry vs satiated). The second factor
represents ‘food attitudes’ at the moment of cheese delivery (future expected hunger at 1:00
p.m. vs future expected satiation at. 3:00 p.m). Hence, this led to the four treatment groups dis-
played in two rows and two columns in Table 1. The rows being H0 (currently hungry) and S0
(currently satiated) and the columns being H1 (future hungry) and S1 (future satiated). The
first treatment group (H0H1) denotes that participants were currently hungry and that they
would receive the cheese when they expected to be hungry. The second treatment group (S0H1)
denotes that satiated individuals would receive the cheese when they expected to be hungry.
The third combination (H0S1) consisted of currently hungry participants who would receive
the cheese products when they expected to be satiated.
Finally, the fourth treatment group (S0S1) denotes that satiated participants would receive
the cheese products when they expected to be satiated. Hence, projection bias is not only tested
by the current levels of hunger or satiety but also by future perceived levels of hunger or satiety
of the subjects, since we informed participants before the bidding process when the product
would be delivered.
Hypothesis definition
Three hypotheses were outlined to test for projection bias. The first hypothesis to test is
whether the WTP for different cheese products exhibited by hungry participants is equal to the
WTP for cheese products by satiated subjectswhen they will receive the cheese the next day,
beingeither hungry or satiated:
H01 ¼WTPðH0H1;H0S1Þ ¼WTPðS0H1; S0S1Þ
H11 ¼WTPðH0H1;H0S1Þ >WTPðS0H1; S0S1Þ
If the null hypothesis is rejected, it means that projection bias exists. That is because the cur-
rently hungry participants who will receive the cheese the following day when they expect to be
either hungry or satiated, will presume that the current hunger will endure into the future and,
thus, they will overvalue the cheeses. However, when they are currently satisfied, they will not
overvalue the cheeses because of their satiated state, even if predicted to be either hungry or
Table 1. Experimental design.
Level of hunger Food attitudes
H1 S1
H0 H0H1 H0S1
S0 S0H1 S0S1
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0146308.t001
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satiated in the future. Hence, currently hungry people underappreciate the impact of being sati-
ated in the future on their utility, thus leading them to value the cheese more than they should
have done if they were satiatedin the future.
The second hypothesis concerning projection bias is whether the WTP revealed by currently
hungry or satiated participants who will receive the cheese when they are hungry is equal to the
WTP for cheeses delivered the next day when they are satiated:
H02 ¼WTPðH0H1; S0H1Þ ¼WTPðH0S1; S0S1Þ
H12 ¼WTPðH0H1; S0H1Þ >WTPðH0S1; S0S1Þ
If the null hypothesis is rejected then it means that the projection bias exists because given
either state (hungry or satiated), participants were willing to pay more to get the cheese when
they anticipated being hungry in the future than when they anticipated being satiated.
Finally, since there is an interaction effect between current hungry and future hungry situa-
tions and between current and future satiated situations which could exist, a third hypothesis
was established. Hypothesis 3 is whether the difference in the WTP between hungry partici-
pants who will receive the cheeses when they will be either hungry or satiated are equal to the
difference in WTP between satiated people who will receive the cheese when they expect to be
either hungry or satiated, respectively:
H03 ¼WTPðH0H1Þ WTPðH0S1Þ ¼WTPðS0H1Þ WTPðS0S1Þ
H13 ¼WTPðH0H1Þ WTPðH0S1Þ >WTPðS0H1Þ WTPðS0S1Þ
If the null hypotheses is rejected, it means that there is a positive difference in willingness to
pay between future hungry and future satiated participants, but the projection bias makes the
difference greater when one is currently hungry rather than currently satiated.
Implementation of the auction
A non-standard subject pool consisting of 98 consumers was recruited using a stratified random
procedure by age, gender, and education level. In an attempt to ensure that subjects were repre-
sentative of shoppers in stores, we selected those people responsible for the food purchases in the
household and who had previous experience with the products under investigation. In particular,
we recruited two experimental groups;48 people participated in H0H1 and S0H1 treatments,
while 50 individuals participated in H0S1 and S0S1 treatments. According to our experimental
design, we were interested in recruiting hungry participants and in making them satiated during
the experiment. Then, those subjects who stated that they were not hungry before being fed were
excluded from the experiment, which resulted in the removal of nine participants.As shown in
Table 2, the experimental groups did not differ in terms of the percentages of women and men,
age, education and, income. The results of these tests suggest that our randomization was suc-
cessful in equalizing the characteristics of participants between the two experimental groups.
The product selected for the experiment was cheese from semi-cured pasteurized sheep
milk. In particular, there were four different versions of this cheese: (i) cheese without any
claim, (ii) cheese with a health-related claim (a nutritional claim indicating a fat-reduced con-
tent: ‘light’contained 40% less fat than the other cheeses in the experiment), (iii) cheese with a
regional claim (‘protected designation of origin—PDO’), and (iv) cheese with an organic claim
(with the European organic logo). The rest of the cheese characteristics were constant, and the
only difference among them corresponded to the featuresclaimed and mentioned above.
At the beginning of the session, participants were informed that they would receive a fee of
10 euros at the end of the session. Each participant was assigned an ID number and was asked
Projection Bias in Food Choice
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to sign a consent form. Initially, the experimenters provided the participants the instruction
mechanism and the information on the products sheets. In order to avoid any communication
among the participants, during the auction, each consumer was positioned separately from the
others, and the monitors stressed that communication was not allowed during the auction. The
subjects were fully briefed on the procedure of the auction method using a blackboard and
scripts, and they were informed about the dominant strategy to reveal their true values for the
products offered. Since participants were cheese consumers, they were not given any bid limits.
A practice task with four different candy barswas conducted to allow participants the opportu-
nity to understand the auction mechanism.
During the auction, each participant was asked to submit simultaneously a bid for each of
the four cheese products. The bids were collected and this step was repeated during three addi-
tional rounds. At the end of the third round, we manipulated the hungry/satiated state by pro-
viding the participants with an amount of unrelated food (e.g., tortilla, vegetables, squid, tapas
and water), asking them to eat until they felt satiated. Participants were not allowed to commu-
nicate with each other when eating.When all the rounds were conducted, the ‘n’ was randomly
chosen to determine the binding price (nth highest bid for the product). Also, a random draw
determined which of the six rounds was binding. Then, a random draw determined which of
the four cheese products was binding. However, the product was handdelivered to the highest
bidders the next day wherever they wished. The timing of delivery on the subsequent day
depended upon the treatment (i.e. before lunch or after lunch).
Hunger rating
Amanipulation check question (How hungry are you?) to measure the subjective degree of
feelings of starvationwas posed to subjects before starting the auction and after having eaten
Table 2. Sample characteristics and demographic variables definition %.
Treatments
Demographic caracteristics H0H1 S0H1 H0S1 S0S1
Gender
Male 50.0 50.0 40.4 40.4
Female 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
Test (χ2); (p-value) 0.8217; 0.365
Age
Less than 35 years old 33.3 33.3 31.0 31.0
Between 36–54 years old 23.8 23.8 34.0 34.0
More than 55 years old 42.9 42.9 34.0 34.0
Test (χ2); (p-value) 1.259;0.533
Education of respondent
Elementary School 14.3 14.3 19.1 19.1
High School 52.4 52.4 46.8 46.8
University 33.3 33.3 34.1 34.1
Test (χ2); (p-value) 0.453; 0.798
Average Household monthly income
€600–€1,500 19.1 19.1 23.4 23.4
€1,501–€2,500 57.1 57.1 44.7 44.7
More than €2,500 23.8 23.8 31.9 31.9
Test (χ2); (p-value) 1.397;0.497
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0146308.t002
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the food. Responses are on a Likert scale where 1 indicates ‘not at all’ and 5 indicates the high-
est intensity of hunger [20–21].
Results
Manipulation checks
Table 3 reports the mean level of the self-reported hunger of participants and the t-test results.
The averages of the self-reported hunger levels of participants before and after the manipula-
tion of their hunger were statistically different at the 5% significance level. These results indi-
cate that participants stated a significantly lower self-reported level of hunger after eating and
that they were indeed hungry at the beginning of the experiment and became satiated
afterward.
Preliminary analysis
Table 4 reports the average bids for each cheese product across the six rounds and 4 treatments.
It is observed that generally the average bids of the first round are statistically different from
the second round for all cheese products (unlabelled: t = 2.81, p-value = 0.003; PDO: t = 2.54,
p-value = 0.006; light: t = 2.94, p-value = 0.002; organic: t = 1.70, p-value = 0.04). However,
average bids in the third round are not statistically different from average bids in the second
round (unlabelled: t = 0.67, p-value = 0.499; PDO: t = 1.46, p-value = 0.146; light: t = 0.33, p-
value = 0.739; organic: t = 0.76, p-value = 0.444). These results indicate that hungry participants
learned and gained experience with the mechanism due to the learning effect. However, the
Table 3. Level of self-reported participants´hunger between treatments.
Treatments
H0H1 S0H1 H0S1 S0S1
Self-reported hunger level 3.14 1.19 2.85 1.48
t-test (p-value) 12.2 (0.000)* 9.9 (0.000)*
*It denotes statistically significant differences at 1%, respectively
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0146308.t003
Table 4. Mean bids (€/100 grams) for each cheese across treatments.
H0 S0
Cheese Round1 Round2 Round3 Round4 Round5 Round6
Unlabelled
H1 1.14 1.06 1.06 1.05 1.05 1.04
S1 1.07 1.02 1.00 0.94 0.92 0.92
PDO
H1 1.46 1.38 1.38 1.32 1.32 1.31
S1 1.32 1.26 1.22 1.09 1.07 1.08
Light
H1 1.35 1.28 1.28 1.19 1.21 1.20
S1 1.17 1.07 1.06 0.92 0.91 0.92
Organic
H1 1.42 1.37 1.38 1.36 1.29 1.28
S1 1.28 1.21 1.17 1.12 1.10 1.10
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0146308.t004
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average bids of cheese products in the fourth round, after subjects were fed, are statistically
fewer than the average bids in the third round before the hunger manipulation (unlabelled:
t = 1.48, p-value = 0.07; PDO: t = 2.04, p-value = 0.02; light: t = 2.49, p-value = 0.007; organic:
t = 2.03, p-value = 0.002). This result implies that the hunger manipulation brought about
some effect on the bidding behaviour of participants. Finally, as expected, the average bids in
the fourth round are not statistically different from average bids in the fifth round (unlabelled:
t = 0.51, p-value = 0.604; PDO: t = 1.03, p-value = 0.146; light: t = -0.105, p-value = 0.913;
organic: t = 2.12, p-value = 0.03) and the sixth round (unlabelled: t = 0.59, p-value = 0.55; PDO:
t = -0.28, p-value = 0.77; light: t = -0.12, p-value = 0.901; organic: t = 0.21, p-value = 0.827).
These results confirm that individuals had already learned during the previous rounds and that
hunger manipulations (current and future) were the only effects produced during the
experiment.
Hypothesis testing
The whole sample dataset contains the pooled bids of each subject by round and for the four
cheese products. Firstly, to test the three hypotheses concerning projection bias, anANOVA
analysis with a model of two main effects (H0 and H1) and one interaction between H0 and H1
was taken into consideration. Secondly, to decide the best specification for testing projection
bias, we used our ANOVA model for each cheese product and for pooled cheese products. As
shown in Table 5, by comparing the ANOVA models, wenoticed the existence of little evidence
that the projection bias affects cheeses differently.
This result was also confirmed by the ANOVA analysis using the type of cheese as third fac-
tor and the covariance analysis using the Likelihood Ratio (LR).
Hence, to test the hypotheses of projection bias we considered the pooled model consisting
of average bids for the four cheeses as shown in the last columns of Table 5. Moreover, the aver-
age pooled bid values across the four treatments are shown in Table 6.
Generally, as shown in Table 6, the average bids for all cheeses were higher when subjects
were currently hungry than when they were satiated. To illustrate, the average bids for cheese
products were higher in H0H1 than in S0H1. Moreover, average bids were higher in H0S1 than
in S0S1.These results are confirmed by the ANOVA analysis as illustrated in Table 4. It is evi-
dent that the main effect of current hunger H0was on average bid values, meaning that we are
able to reject the first hypothesis of projection bias. This result suggests that participants
Table 5. ANOVA analysis: testing projection bias across the four cheese products and for pooled data.
Unlabelled PDO Light Organic Pooled model
MSe F p-value MSe F p-value MSe F p-value MSe F p-value MSe F p-value
H0 0.83 4.66 0.03 2.42 8.74 0.00 2.36 6.76 0.00 0.91 2.19 0.13 6.15 19.5 0.00
H1 1.14 6.42 0.01 3.54 12.77 0.00 5.64 16.09 0.00 2.72 6.56 0.01 12.7 38.7 0.00
H0 * H1 0.17 0.98 0.32 0.27 0.98 0.32 0.24 0.70 0.40 0.03 0.08 0.77 0.65 2.08 0.15
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0146308.t005
Table 6. Average Bids across the four treatments(€/100 grams).
Treatments Mean bids Standar Deviation
H0H1 1.29 0.61
S0H1 1.22 0.56
H0S1 1.15 0.54
S0S1 1.00 0.52
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0146308.t006
Projection Bias in Food Choice
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overvalued the cheese products more when they were hungry rather than when they were sati-
ated, both when they would expect to receive the cheese when they would be either hungry and
satiated. Hence, for any given future state, subjects were willing to pay more when they were
currently hungry than when they were satiated.
On the other hand, the average bids in H0H1 were higher than in H0S1. Likewise, the average
bids in the S0H1 were higher than in S0S1,thus suggesting that participants overvalued the
cheeses more when they were delivered in the future hungry treatment than in the satiated one.
Indeed, the ANOVA analysis also confirmed the main effect of future hunger (H1) on average
bid values, suggesting that we are able to reject the second hypothesis of projection bias. This
result implies that for any current hungry or satiated state, participants were willing to pay
more when they anticipated being hungry. Finally, the absence of significant interaction
between H0 and H1suggests that we are not able to reject the third hypothesis. From the results,
there was no statistical basis for concluding that immediate hunger level of individuals had a
statistically greater effect on average bid values in comparison to future hunger levels, and that
the projection bias does not make the difference between H1 and S1 when one is currently hun-
gry rather than currently satiated. In other words, current hunger,H0,and future hunger,H1,had
an independent and added effect on average bid values since the empathy gaps were of about
equal size as stated by [5].
In conclusion, overall findings suggest clear, quantifiable evidence of the projection bias in
consumer food preferences. In particular, currently hungry participants overvalued cheese
delivered in the future treatments with an additional premium of 11 cents on average, com-
pared to satiated subjects. Overvaluing by currently hungry participants was slightly more pro-
nounced (12.5 cents) when cheese was delivered in a future hungry treatment rather than in
the satiated one.
Conclusions
It is widely documented in experimental settings from social psychology literature that individ-
uals can often make decisions that are not in their best interest (e.g. in terms of their long-term
health). One of the reasons is that the level of hunger of individuals could make difficult to pre-
dict their behaviour when they will be in a different emotionally ‘cold’ state (e.g. satiated)
because their current ‘hot’ state (e.g. hungry) overrides them. Therefore, while individuals
understand the directions in which their tastes will change, they can be prone to systematically
underestimate or overestimate the magnitude of these changes.
The objective of our study was to test the existence of projection bias using a non-
hypothetical artefactual experiment (i.e. experimental auction) to provide quantified evidence
of projection bias. Specifically, we examined whether projection bias exists when hungry and
non-hungry subjects were incentivized to reveal their WTP. Participants were fed to the point
of satiety after a few rounds of the auction to manipulate their hunger level.
Results confirmed the existence of projection bias when consumers made their decisions
concerning food products. Specifically, projection bias exists because, for any future state, par-
ticipants were willing to pay a higher price premium for the cheese when they were currently
hungry than when satiated. In addition, projection bias exists because given any current state
(hungry or satiated), participants were willing to pay more to get the cheese when they antici-
pated being hungry in the future. However, we are not able to conclude whether an immediate
hunger level had a statistically greater effect on average bid values than a future hunger level.
The existence of projection bias in our results has marketing implications for the food
industry. Firstly, food companies are advertising their food products indeed when consumers
are expected to be hungry when exposure to food advertising might create expectations in
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terms of tastier food. Because food advertising rises emotional utility for consumers theymay
perceive food productsas worth more than their objective value, and so they are willing to pay
more to get them. Secondly, food advertising could stimulates the desire for a product not only
when people are currently hungry, but also when they anticipate being hungry because the pal-
atable food stimuli can trigger an hedonic hunger. Finally, another possible marketing strategy
conducted by food companies is to set testing promotions at stores and supermarkets before
lunch and dinner time. Therefore, shoppers might start to crave the food and then to project
how much food they want or need, thereby driving up sales, whether or not they were initially
hungry.
However, from the consumer`s perspective, targeting hunger may drive consumers to pur-
chase unhealthy food such as junk food because they become more sensitive to future cravings
when they are currently experiencing a craving. Therefore, the findings of this study also sug-
gest that individuals should avoid buying food when they are in a hungry state because they
will be more likely to purchase unhealthy food and pay more for it than when they are satiated.
Finally, our results also have significant implications for the design and use of non-hypo-
thetical experimental auctions to elicit WTP values from subjects for food products. For exam-
ple, our results suggest that if participants have projection bias, their bidding decisions can be
influenced by their current levels of hunger or satiety. This finding is important since hunger
levels of participants are not taken into account in experimental auctions. Given the increasing
importance and use of experimental auctions to elicit consumers’ preferences and WTP values
for marketing and policy purposes, researchers and practitioners should take into account the
hunger level and control this factor when designing an experimental auction. If this is not
taken into account, valuations may be skewed by participants’ projection bias.
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